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Introduction 
 
The indigenous peoples of India, the Adivasis, represent the largest indigenous 
population within the borders of a state. According to the United Nations there are 
over 300 million indigenous peoples in the world1 and 70 million of them live in 
India. The indigenous population of India represents more than 8 percent of the total 
Indian population.2 The indigenous peoples of India live in different parts of the 
country, from the northern mountains down to the central and southern plains of India 
and represent an astonishing complex and rich account of the world cultural diversity. 
The Adivasi population is spread across the whole country; however, there are some 
important numerical differences within the different Indian states. Some states, like 
the central and northeastern states, have a large indigenous population – in some 
instances, even a majority. For example, in Mizoram, indigenous peoples comprise 95 
percent of the population. However, in others, such as Uttar Pradesh, they represent 
just 0.2 percent of the total state population. Composed of thirty states and more than 
one billion people speaking several different languages, India represents a vast and 
ambitious project of bringing together peoples of different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds in a ‘united and multicultural’ democracy. In this ‘big puzzle of ethnic 
and communal division’,3 the political and legal situations faced by different 
indigenous populations of the country are fairly similar. The position of the 
government of India has always been contradictory with regard to its large indigenous 
population. On the one hand there is a real policy of protection and promotion of 
indigenous rights, as the Constitution of India explicitly recognises the rights of the 
                     
1UN Chronicle (UN Publications, June 1993), p. 40. 
21991 Census; figures for 2001 are available at 
 www.censusindia.net/2001housing/housing_tables_main.html, last consulted 9 July 2003.   
3A. Lijphart, ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation’ (1996) 90 American 
Political Science Review 258. 
tribes and puts in place a system of positive discrimination in their favour. On the 
other hand, however, government policy is often at the fulcrum of indigenous 
oppression and appropriation of indigenous lands and generally the ‘legal and 
constitutional frame is defeated by a co-opted leadership, weak political will, poor 
execution coupled with ignorance, poverty and lack of organisation as an interest 
group’.4   
 
As in many other countries, the bedrock of the indigenous struggle is the land 
ownership issue. All over the country, the Adivasis are pushing the political and legal 
agenda for the recognition of their right to self-determination, the recognition of 
customary land tenure systems, and the restoration of traditional lands. From the 
northeastern states to the southern states of India, indigenous peoples’ land ownership 
is at the forefront of the struggle. The situation of the Adivasis relating to the right to 
own their lands varies considerably within the country with the struggle touching 
every aspect of the spectrum of the land rights issue. In the northeast, the struggle 
focuses on the range of options presented by access to ‘self-determination’, whereas 
in some other parts of the country the struggle is for access to natural resources, right 
of livelihood through legal ownership, or simply the right to live on their lands. But, 
in any case, both federal and state governments tend to react with the same level of 
intensity, leading to extensive human rights violations. This tendency is especially 
true in some parts of the northeastern regions (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland) where 
arbitrary arrest, torture, and rape are widespread, and where a state of emergency 
prevails allowing for arrests of suspicious persons for up to one year without charges 
or legal proceedings.5 Thus, even though the situations faced by the Adivasis vary 
considerably within the country, they face similar pressures as elsewhere vis-à-vis 
ownership of their own territories. In past years, Adivasis have been more and more 
organised and united in their struggle for the recognition of their land rights.  This 
activity makes India a good illustration of the indigenous struggle worldwide: in 
particular, for a study of the political organisation of indigenous movements in their 
fight for the recognition of land rights. The activities employed in this battle range 
                     
4Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Human Rights and Poverty Eradication – A Talisman for the 
Commonwealth, (CHRI’s Millennium Report, New Delhi, 2001).  
5See: Indigenous Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, The Indigenous World (IWGIA, Copenhagen, 
2000-2001), pp. 407-411. 
from armed struggle and large-scale movements of civil disobedience, to political 
lobbying and individual hunger strikes.  
 
The purpose of the present chapter is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to emphasise that even 
though the Indian legislation provides the Adivasis population with specific 
entitlements over their territories, those rights are not properly enforced or are often 
violated. Secondly, this chapter proposes to explore the issue of the recognition of 
indigenous land rights and its fundamental linkage with the recognition of indigenous 
customary land tenure systems, and autonomy vis-à-vis internal legislation. In this 
regard, the case of the Adivasis of India reveals that the distinction often made in 
international law between autonomy and collective land rights is empirically blurred 
by the practical experience that the Adivasis have lived in the very recent past. 
Ultimately, the present chapter seeks to argue that the failure of the central 
government to ensure indigenous peoples’ ownership of their lands has ratcheted up 
the struggle of the Adivasis to a phase where claims for autonomy and self-
determination are becoming the main focus of indigenous survival across the country. 
 
Racism and Definition: Are the Adivasis Indigenous? 
 
At the World Conference Against Racism, a member of the Indian National Human 
Rights Commission highlighted that ‘…there can be no doubt that in India – as 
everywhere else in the world – history and society have been scarred by 
discrimination and inequality.’6  
 
The indigenous peoples of India have been submitted to a system of segregation from 
very early in the history of the country tracing back to about 3500 BC when the 
Aryans arrived in India and introduced the Varna system. Varna means ‘colour’ and 
the Adivasis were called Atisudra, meaning ‘lower than the Sudras’, the untouchables. 
The Aryans introduced a system that still prevails today – the caste system – that has a 
great impact on indigenous peoples, as they are considered so low that they are 
                     
6Statement at the Plenary of WCAR, National Human Rights Commission, Dr. Justice K. Ramaswamy, 
<www.un.org/WCAR/statements/india_hrE.htm>, last consulted 9 July 2003. 
included only at the very bottom of the social system.7 There has been huge social 
pressure from the Hindu religious system on all indigenous social structures. The fact 
that the Adivasis are considered even lower in the social hierarchy than the so-called 
‘untouchables’ explains the general racism suffered by them. This racism is firmly 
rooted within Indian society and often reflected within the Indian legislation.8 Such 
legislative racism started a long time ago, as when the British colonized India, one of 
the first laws undertaken by the British administration regarding the tribals was the 
Criminal Tribes Act 1871. This Act ‘notified’ some of the tribes as criminals from 
birth, affirming that entire tribal communities were born criminals due to their 
nomadic lifestyle.9 With independence, the new government amended this Act and 
have since ‘denotified’ the nomadic tribes. However after several substantive 
amendments, the Act was renamed Habitual Offenders Act and still concerns more 
than 2 percent of the Indian population that is classified as ‘denotified and nomadic 
tribes’.10  
 
The Adivasis claim that they are the original settlers of the country, a claim which is 
not fully accepted by the government. The word Adivasi comes from the Sanskrit and 
is a conjunction of two words: Adi meaning ‘original’ and Vasi meaning 
‘inhabitant’.11 The use of this term is preferred to the term ‘tribes’ or ‘tribal’, because 
those terms echo the colonial past of the country, and the use of the term Adivasi is 
also the symbol of the new political organisation of the indigenous movement in 
India.12 Officially, the Constitution uses the term ‘Schedule Tribes’; such nuances 
remain important, since, according to the government of India, there are no Adivasis – 
only ‘Schedule Tribes’ – in the country. The usual argument made by the government 
is that India was previously Hindustan: the country of the Hindus who are the 
                     
7S. Chakma, ‘Setting the Records Straight’ in S. Chakma and M. Jensen (eds.) Racism Against 
Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA Document No. 15, Copenhagen, 2001), p. 11. 
8S. Chakma, ‘Behind the Bamboo Curtain: Racism in Asia’ in S. Chakma and M. Jensen (eds.) Racism 
Against Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA Document No. 15, Copenhagen, 2001), p. 176. 
9See: M. Radhakrishna, Dishonoured by History: 'Criminal Tribes' and British Colonial Policy, (Orient 
Longman Limited, New Delhi, 2001). 
10On this issue, see: S. Chakma, ‘Behind the Bamboo Curtain: Racism in Asia’ in S. Chakma and M. 
Jensen (eds.), supra note 8, p. 176. 
11On this issue see: C. Bates, ‘Lost Innocents and the Loss of Innocence: Interpreting Adivasi 
Movements in South Asia’ in R.H. Barnes, A. Gray, and B. Kingsbury (eds.) Indigenous Peoples of 
Asia (Association for Asian Studies, Inc., No. 48), p. 103.  
12However, in this chapter, the term ‘Tribal’ or ‘Tribes’ is used when referring to official figures, 
documents, or legislation. 
indigenous population of the country.13 It is therefore a very sensitive issue and, 
accordingly, in India the Constitution gives power to the President to designate 
‘Schedule Tribes’. This power is achieved by Presidential decree seeking to define 
which indigenous community should be recognised for this purpose, and when such 
recognition is made, the official term ‘Scheduled Tribes’ attaches itself to the 
population, bringing it under the special protection of the Constitution. The 
Constitution itself thus defines ‘Scheduled Tribes’ in Article 366 (25):  ‘Scheduled 
Tribes’ means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such 
tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes 
for the purposes of this constitution.’ 
 
Article 342(1) empowers the President of India to specify the tribal communities of 
India. By this procedure, an important number of Adivasis communities have not been 
recognised as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and are still claiming recognition in order to gain 
access to the legal protection to which they are entitled. In 1952, the Commissioner 
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes issued a list of criteria for identifying a 
tribe and included it in the Schedule: 
 
a. Autochthony; 
b. Groupism or a very strong community fellowship, if not descent from common ancestor or 
loyality to a common headman or chief; 
c. A principal, if not an exclusive habitant; 
d. A distinctive way of life, primitive or backward by modern standards and apart and aside 
from the main current of culture; 
e. Economic, political and social backwardness.14 
 
These criteria compare reasonably well to the different international definitions of 
indigenous peoples used by the UN, the ILO, and the World Bank. For each of these 
three institutions, though their views vary, the notions of descent, territory, distinctive 
way of life, non-dominance, and economic, social and political disadvantages are 
central features to the definition of indigenousness.15 India, however, rejects the 
recognition of Adivasis as indigenous peoples at an international level. Instead, the 
                     
13This issue is one of the central issues of the tension between Hindus and Muslims.  For an illustration 
in the state of Maharashtra, see: C. Talwalker, ‘Shivaji’s Army and Other “Natives” in Bombay’ (1996) 
16 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 114. 
14Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Manager of Publications, 
Government of India, New Delhi, 1952). 
15See: J. M. Cobo, ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations’, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, paras. 379-80; ILO Convention 169, 27 June 1989, 28 ILM 1382, 
Article 1 (1); World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 (reprinted in IWGIA, Newsletter, Nov/Dec 
1991). 
government argues that the notion of indigenous peoples does not apply to the tribal 
groups of the country because the whole population of the country is indigenous. This 
argument posits that after centuries of migration it would be impossible to 
differentiate between the first inhabitants and the several generations resulting from 
the Indian ‘melting pot’. Thus, on several occasions, Indian representatives to the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations have highlighted that ‘Scheduled Tribes’ 
of India are not indigenous peoples.16 At the UN level, however, Adivasi 
representatives are usually recognised as indigenous representatives by the 
ECOSOC17 and participate in the debates of the Working Group.18 In its periodic 
report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
Indian government stated that Article 1 of the Convention was not applicable in 
India.19 However, based on the notion of descent mentioned in article 1 of the 
Convention, the CERD affirmed that ‘... the situation of the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes falls within the scope of the Convention.’20 In a similar vein, the 
World Bank, in its developmental programmes, classified Scheduled Tribes as 
indigenous peoples. It is also worth noting that India was one of the first countries to 
ratify the ILO Convention 107, which concerns indigenous populations.21 As argued 
by Das, it should be affirmed that the ‘Scheduled Tribes’ of India, the Adivasis, are 
certainly indigenous peoples: 
 
By refusing to acknowledge that there are indigenous peoples in India, all that the government seeks to achieve is 
to ensure that there are no problems for it to discuss in the UN Sub-Committee. The fear of the government to 
accept the existence of Indigenous Peoples is that the acceptance would eventually mean ratification of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in future making it much more obligatory for the government of 
India to fulfil the demands of autonomy as per the Constitution, on the one hand, while on the other more such 
demands are obviously going to emerge from other areas as the process of internal colonisation of Adivasis gain 
momentum in the wake of the opening up of the nation for the imperialists.22 
                     
16For examples, see: U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33, p. 13; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, p. 22. 
17For example, the Indian Council of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples is affiliated with the World 
Council of Indigenous Peoples that has the consultative status with the ECOSOC. 
18However, see: M.A. Martínez, ‘Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements 
between States and Indigenous Populations’, Final Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20, paras. 
90-91. 
19See: U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.13 and CERD/C/299/Add.3. 
20U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.13, para. 14. 
21See: R.D. Munda, ‘India’s Protection and Promotion of Tribal Rights: Obligations under ILO 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 1957 (No.107)’ (Paper Submitted at Indigenous Rights 
in the Commonwealth Project, South & South East Asia Regional Expert Meeting, New-Delhi, 2002) 
<www.cpsu.org.uk/projects/DELHI_P2.htm>, March 2002. 
22J.K. Das, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2001), 
p. 35. 
 Based on the position of the Indian government and its policy regarding the 
Scheduled Tribes, it can be affirmed that the rejection of the recognition of the 
Adivasis as indigenous peoples is a simple case of political hypocrisy that is hiding 
racism. Evidence of such hypocrisy is highlighted through the policy of positive 
discrimination, and the set of rights that the Indian legislation put in place with regard 
to its tribal population. With varying degrees of success, such legislation addresses all 
the specific entitlements of indigenous peoples in international law, i.e., specific 
legislation regarding occupation of their ancestral lands, legislation in favour of the 
protection of the indigenous cultures and languages, and some autonomy rights. 
Under the heading of ‘Scheduled Tribes’, the Indian Constitution specifically 
organises some ratio regulations to encourage positive discrimination and affirmative 
action in favour of the tribals. According to their proportion of the total population, 8 
percent of the jobs in the public service are reserved for Adivasis. The Constitution 
also includes some clauses for the protection and promotion of indigenous languages 
and cultures. However, an evaluation of the situation today quickly reveals that such 
special provisions have failed to bring positive gains for the Adivasis; for instance, 
Adivasis still represent only 2 percent of personnel in public services. Constitutional 
provisions relating to education have also failed, as tribal children have had to study 
in a language foreign to them. As a result, most Scheduled Tribes lag behind the 
majority population of India with regard to development indicators (85 percent of the 
Adivasis live below the poverty line and even though 90 percent of them depend on 
agriculture for their livelihood, it is estimated that about 10 million of the indigenous 
peoples live in urban slums).23 Thus, even though there are some potentially positive 
provisions in the Constitution, these provisions seem only notional since the political 
will to implement them has been lacking since the beginning. As in many other 
countries with a large indigenous population, one of the central angles of the 
Constitution concerns the land rights issue. 
 
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Indian Policy Regarding Adivasis Land 
Rights 
 
                     
23On this issue, see: Minority Rights Group, ‘Development, Equity & Justice: Adivasi Communities in 
India in the Era of Liberalization and Globalization’ (MRG Workshop Report Title, 6-9 April, 1998). 
Constitutional Entitlements: An Overview 
 
In India, like in Australia or North America and many other places, the concept of 
land ownership started with the arrival of European colonisers. When the British 
arrived, they started a huge enterprise of forestry across the country and introduced 
the idea of property of forestlands resulting in the loss of land ownership for a large 
number of Adivasis. Prior to the arrival of the British, there was no record of land 
ownership in India and some of the first pieces of land legislation adopted under 
British rule remained in use until the 1980s. Independent India has often re-used the 
schemes put in place by the British administration in its tribal policy. In 1874, the 
British introduced the notion of ‘Scheduled Areas’ to provide tribals with special 
protection; by the same token, the Indian Constitution also provides special provisions 
for ‘Scheduled Areas’. However, one of the objectives of Indian policy since 
independence has been the protection of its tribal population against land alienation 
by non-tribals. There are two annexes to the Constitution that deal with indigenous 
peoples’ land rights, the Fifth and Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The Fifth 
Schedule gives special protection to the ‘Scheduled Tribes’ that are included within 
the territory of the ‘Scheduled Areas’, meaning the eight states that the Constitution 
officially proclaimed as ‘scheduled’.24 Thus, several states, especially in the south of 
the country, are not included in the Scheduled Areas even though large Adivasi 
communities inhabit those states. The prime objective of this part of the Constitution 
is to create special provisions for the development of tribal lands and to prevent their 
alienation. Within the Scheduled Areas, in order to protect the Scheduled Tribes, the 
Governor of each of the eight federal states, who represents the executive, has the 
power to restrict the application of any legislation of the state parliaments that might 
apply to Scheduled Areas. The Governor is also in charge of making regulations to: 
 
(a) prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among members of the Scheduled Tribes in 
such areas; 
(b) regulate the allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas; 
(c) regulate the carrying on of business as money-lender by persons who lend money to 
members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area.25 
                     
24These states are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, 
and Rajasthan. 
25Constitution of India, Art. 244 (1), Part B, 5. 
 Nevertheless, before making such regulation, the Governor is required to consult the 
Tribes Advisory Council. The Tribes Advisory Councils are bodies established in 
each state having Scheduled Areas, and consist of twenty members, fifteen of whom 
are representatives of the Scheduled Tribes in the state legislative assembly. However, 
even though the Governor has to consult the Tribes Advisory Councils it must do so 
only as an advisory body on ‘matters pertaining to the welfare and the advancement of 
the Scheduled Tribes’. Before making any regulation, the Governor has to submit it to 
the President for assent. Thus, even though land is a subject that comes under the 
power of each state, the central government has an advisory and coordinating role in 
every land program in the country.  
 
The other scheme of the Constitution, the Sixth Schedule, a much more complex part, 
provides for some autonomy to specific tribes of the Northeast. This part of the 
Constitution is applicable only in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and 
Mizoram, and reflects the legacy of the history of resistance of the Northeastern tribes 
towards colonisers.26 When independence was proclaimed, the geopolitical situation 
in the Northeast implied that the Constitution recognised special autonomy rights for 
those regions.27 In this sense, the Fifth Schedule is the generally applicable rule, with 
the Sixth Schedule seen as the special law. The Sixth Schedule creates some elected 
bodies, notably Autonomous District Councils that are given some administrative and 
legislative powers, even though the Governor always ultimately controls such 
powers.28 Relating to Adivasi land rights, the Sixth Schedule gives power to these 
prescribed autonomous bodies to legislate on the allotment, occupation, use, or setting 
apart of land, the management of the forest, the inheritance of property, and on the 
regulation of money-lending.29  
 
                     
26See: Chakravorty, Birendra C., British Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam since 1858 (Calcutta, 
India: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1981). 
27On the drafting of the Constitution, see: R. Joshi, M. Pinto, L. D’Silva, The Indian Constitution and 
its Working (Orient Longman, Bombay, 1986) and B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of the India’s 
Constitution: Select Documents (N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1967). 
28See: Supreme Court of India, Edwingson v. The State of Assam, AIR (1966) SC 1220; and State of 
Assam v. K.B. Kurkalang, AIR (1972) SC 223. 
29On the limitation of the power of the District Council, see: Supreme Court of India, District Council 
of U.K. & J.H. v. Sitimon, AIR (1972) SC 787. 
Thus, there are two major schemes in the Constitution; the Fifth Schedule tends to be 
protective and ‘paternalistic’ as the government is in charge of any development in 
tribal lands, whereas the Sixth Schedule is more in favour of self-management.30 
While these two parts of the Constitution are the pillars of legislation regarding tribal 
land rights, several other statutes also deal with Adivasis land rights. As stated earlier, 
the federal government has an advisory and coordinating role in national land policy 
but the states are the prime actors in implementing land reforms.31 Thus, in 
concordance with the Constitution, both the central government and state 
governments have enacted laws based on two main principles: the prohibition of tribal 
land alienation (e.g. transfer of individual tribal land to non-tribal individuals) and the 
restoration of alienated lands. However, while this has been official state policy, the 
reality is that the federal and the state governments are often responsible for the 
grabbing of Adivasi lands through many means such as manipulation of laws, the 
national forest policy, the large scale development programmes, the non- 
implementation of the land restoration policy, and/or simply by not protecting tribal 
lands against transnational corporations. Three major angles of the policy that has 
been undertaken by the government of India with regard to tribal lands seem crucial to 
appreciate the failure of the Indian policy: 
 
1.  The proposition to amend the protection of land alienation of tribal 
lands to non-tribals; 
2. The failure and non-implementation of the restoration policy of the 
stolen lands;  
3. The usurpation of tribal lands under land acquisition laws coupled with 
the lack of a proper rehabilitation policy for persons forcibly displaced. 
 
The Real Face of the Central Government: Attempting to Subvert the Constitutional 
Provisions 
 
During the 1990s, the Andhra Pradesh government leased some forestlands of 
indigenous peoples to a company to exploit calcite. The High Court dismissed the 
                     
30The self-management orientation of the Sixth Schedule will be analysed in the latter section relating 
to self-rules and autonomy.  
31For an overview of states’ policy see: S.N. Mishra (ed.), Ownership and Control of Resources Among 
Indian Tribes (Inter-India Publications, Tribal Studies of India Series T 184, Vol.3, 1998). 
case filed by the NGO Samatha on behalf of the Adivasi. The Supreme Court upheld 
the case and annulled the lease in what became the landmark judgment known as the 
Samatha case.32 In many respects, the Samatha case can be regarded as the ‘Indian 
Mabo’, as its consequences regarding indigenous peoples’ land rights in India is very 
similar to the impact of the Mabo decision in Australia. One the central issues in the 
case concerned the meaning of the legal prohibition of ‘transfer of immovable 
property to any person other than a tribal’ as enacted in the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled 
Area Transfer Regulation. The question for the judges was to define whether the word 
‘person’ would include the state government. The Supreme Court stated that the word 
‘person’ would include natural persons as well as judicial persons and constitutional 
governments. In this regard, this judgment had far-reaching consequences across the 
country as the Supreme Court clarified the content of the Fifth Schedule of the 
Constitution by stating that government lands, tribal lands, and forestlands that are 
included in the Scheduled Areas cannot be leased out to non-tribals or to private 
companies for mining or industrial operations. Consequently, all mining leases 
granted by the state governments in Fifth Scheduled Areas were now suddenly illegal 
and the government was asked to stop all illegal mining and other industrial activities 
within the Scheduled Areas. This ruling of the Supreme Court had a strong impact all 
over the country, as 90 percent of India’s coal mines and 80 percent of the forests and 
other natural resources are on Adivasi lands.33 Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh 
government, as well as the central government, filed appeals to the Supreme Court, 
both of which were dismissed.34 In 2000, the Ministry of Mines, in a document 
classified ‘secret’, proposed to the Committee of Secretaries of the government of 
India that it modify the Constitution to subvert the Supreme Court judgment and 
allow private investors to own tribal lands. In this note, the Attorney General 
suggested that the amendment of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution would be the 
solution ‘to counter the adverse effect of the Samatha judgement’.35 The proposed 
amendment’s purpose is to remove the prohibitions and restrictions on the transfer of 
                     
32Supreme Court of India, Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 8 SCC 191. 
33On the other implications of the judgment, see: PUCL Bulletin 2001, ‘Attempts to Subvert “Samatha” 
Judgment’ (January 2001). 
34For an overview of the legal proceedings, see: South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, 
Racial Discrimination: The Record of India (SAHRDC, New Delhi, 2001), pp. 26-30. 
35Government of India, Ministry of Mines, ‘Note for the Committee of Secretaries regarding 
amendment of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India in the light of the Samatha Judgment’ 
(No.16/48/97-M.VI, 10 July 2000). 
land by Adivasis to non-Adivasis for undertaking operations such as mining and any 
other non-agricultural operations.  
 
 
 
Land Alienation and Lack of Rehabilitation Policy 
 
Since independence, more than 50 million people have been displaced by large-scale 
development projects, including industries, mines, irrigation projects, national parks, 
and wildlife sanctuaries, based on the right of land acquisition for ‘public purpose’. 
Forty percent of the total displaced population belongs to groups classified in the 
Scheduled Tribes. Notably, only a quarter of the total displaced population has been 
rehabilitated so far.36 Like everywhere else, this displacement mostly occurs in the 
name of economic interests and ‘development’. India has witnessed many famous 
cases of tribal land alienation for the construction of dams, mining interests, and 
forestry. The Narmada Valley Project, for example, is a plan for the building of 30 
major, 136 medium, and 3,000 minor dams. The scale of the total population affected 
by the overall project is colossal with especially disastrous consequences for the 
Adivasi in terms of displacement and loss of land. More than 90 percent of the people 
affected by the Sardar Sarovar Project, one of the project’s dams, are members of the 
Bhil and Tadavi tribes.37 One of the major objections of the concerned Adivasis has 
been the total lack of rehabilitation policy for those forcibly displaced. This case is 
not isolated, as despite the large amount of displaced persons, India does not have a 
proper national rehabilitation policy.38 To respond to this lack of a national 
rehabilitation policy, the central government put in circulation a scheme for a 
National Policy for Rehabilitation of Persons Displaced as a Consequence of 
Acquisition of Land in 1994. A year later, concerned NGOs published a critique to 
this governmental proposition in the form of a draft bill. This bill was entitled Land 
                     
36A. Ekka, ‘Adivasi Rights: Empowerment and Deprivation’ in Vigil India Movement Human Rights 
2001 (Vigil India Movement 2001), p. 76. 
37S. Kavaljit, ‘The Narmada Issue: An Overview’ Cultural Survival Issue 13.2 ; see also: The 
Constitution (Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Orders (Amendment) Bill (2002). 
38Three states, namely, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, have their own national laws. 
The National Thermal Power Corporation and Coal India promulgated their policies in the 1990s; on 
this issue, see: W. Fernandes and V. Paranjpye (eds.), Rehabilitation Policy and Law in India: A Right 
to Livelihood (Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 1997). 
Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act since one of the pillars of the 
proposal was to link land acquisition and rehabilitation, two areas currently separated 
in Indian legislation.39 Finally, a governmental commission was established to draft 
the future bill. The proposed Bill, designated the Land Acquisition Bill, is an initiative 
that amends the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which, for more than a century, has 
allowed compulsory acquisition of lands for ‘public purpose’. The proposed 
amendment is aimed at facilitating the process of acquisition; for example, the 
government would be allowed to acquire lands for the benefit of private companies 
‘not only for work which would be in the nature of public purpose but also for 
engaging in productive activities that is likely to prove useful to the public’.40 The 
proposed amendment does not address the definition of ‘public purpose’ even though 
there was a grave need for such definition. As highlighted by Ramanathan, one of the 
striking features of the notion of ‘public purpose’ is the fact that courts ‘have 
generally sustained the view that a state’s perception of what constitutes ‘public 
purpose’ cannot be judicially reviewed’ and thus this notion has acquired immunity 
from challenge in the courts.41 The amendment of the Land Acquisition Act was 
expected to redress such loopholes in the land acquisition system but instead the 
proposed amendment excludes rehabilitation measures.42 In response, the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has stated ‘…that provisions relating to the 
resettlement and rehabilitation of persons displaced by land acquisition for 
developmental projects should form a part of the Land Acquisition Act itself (or an 
appropriate separate legislation) so that they are justiciable.’43  
 
The NHRC also highlighted the government’s obligation under ILO Convention 107 
(ILO 107). India is a party to ILO 107, in which article 12(2) especially addresses the 
issues of rehabilitation and resettlement. Article 12(2) reads: ‘When in such cases 
removal of these populations is necessary as an exceptional measure, they shall be 
provided with lands of quality at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied 
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by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development.’44 Even 
though this article of ILO 107 was not specifically mentioned by the NHRC, the 
NHRC took the view that it was desirable to incorporate the rehabilitation and 
resettlement package in the Land Acquisition Act itself, otherwise India would be in 
violation of its international obligations as enacted by ILO 107. 
 
The Setback of the Land Restoration Policy 
 
As in other countries of the world, the government has recognised past abuses and 
started to organise a land restoration process across the country. So far, however, the 
implementation of such a policy has been unsuccessful.  
 
An example of the lack of implementation is visible in Kerala. In 1975, the Kerala 
government adopted the Kerala Scheduled Tribes Act (1975 Act) which was supposed 
to restore some of the one million acres of land that are believed to have been stolen 
by settlers from Adivasis over the last century. However, 27 years after the 1975 Act 
was passed and despite orders from the High Court, this law has not been 
implemented. In 1999, the government of Kerala adopted a new law that sought to 
overturn the 1975 Act. Even though the High Court of Kerala stated that such a law 
could not legally overrule the 1975 Act, the government challenged this decision in 
the Supreme Court in a pending decision that will have serious consequences for the 
whole country.45  
 
Aside from this legal battle, in the months of July-August 2001 several Adivasis died 
of starvation in Kerala, provoking large and well-organized protests by the Adivasis.46 
Subsequent demonstrations were launched by the Adivasis-Dalit Action Council 
agitating for a political discussion within the state and resulting in dialogue between 
government and Adivasi representatives, the cornerstone of which was the land 
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restoration process. In October 2001, an agreement was finally signed that entered 
into force in January 2002. The agreement guarantees the allotment of one to five 
acres of land to landless tribal families. This agreement is the result of the new 
governmental policy based on the idea of providing ‘alternative land’ instead of the 
‘alienated land’ to affected groups, transforming its land restoration policy to a 
rehabilitation policy. Only a few months after the entry into force of this agreement, 
however, it seems that the promised lands are lands and forest lands dedicated to 
timber, naturally protected areas, or lands not suitable for cultivation. Thus, the 
agreement signed by the government appears to be nothing more than empty rhetoric 
as, legally, the landless tribals would not be able to own the promised lands. In a 
recent decision, the High Court of Kerala has already intervened in favour of the 
forest department, as under the 1980 Forest Conservation Act assigning such tracts of 
land to tribal populations is illegal, reasoning that those forest lands fall under the 
jurisdiction of the forest department: and can only be assigned with prior permission 
of the central government.  
 
The government has been accused of ‘double standards’ on the Adivasi rehabilitation 
issue. This criticism was based on the involvement of the state government in 
claiming those lands which had been assigned to the Adivasis as forest lands in 
Mathikettanmala. In this regard, the state government has been blamed for 
‘conspiracy’ with the central forest department to deny land to the Adivasis.47 This 
example shows the hypocrisy and the unwillingness of the state government to 
implement its own policy of land restoration, and reflects a general trend with other 
states who have a fairly similar approach to the issue.48 The case of the Adivasis of 
Kerala points out another fundamental issue in the land rights struggle which is the 
potential conflict between wildlife protection, forest preservation, and Adivasis rights 
of land ownership. 
 
Impact of Wildlife Conservation on Adivasis Land Rights 
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In India, the protection of the environment is often used as a way of expelling 
indigenous peoples from their land in the name of ‘wildlife protection’, notably 
through the establishment of ‘protected areas’ within tribal areas.49 The establishment 
of protected areas, such as national parks or sanctuaries, often disrespects tribal 
relations with land, forest, and water, and often is aimed at expelling tribal 
communities. During colonization, the British introduced the idea that forests should 
be governmentally owned and classified them as ‘protected areas’. The Adivasis, as 
inhabitants of those forest lands, entered into conflict with the British government and 
finally with the Indian government that maintained the same laws.  
 
The legislation that is in contradiction with Adivasis land rights is based on two 
statutory acts: the 1927 Forest Act and the 1972 Wild Life Protection Act. The 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs has highlighted the case of the Van 
Gujjar indigenous peoples of Uttar Pradesh that illustrates such confrontations by 
supporting the resistance organized by this semi-nomadic community against ‘faulty 
conservation policy’.50 In this case, the Uttar Pradesh government had planned to 
convert indigenous homelands into a national park. Under the Wild Life Act of 1972, 
no residence is allowed in national parks, thus forcing expulsion of the indigenous 
populations. This case is an example of larger policy that has been developed across 
the country. Recently, the central government has planned to set-up paramilitary 
forces to ‘protect’ forest areas. Such paramilitary forces regularly threaten indigenous 
inhabitants - with several cases of human rights abuses already registered.51 Another 
important issue in India has been the recent adoption of the Biological Diversity Bill. 
This legislation is the national implementation of the international Convention on 
Biological Diversity52 to which India is a party, and which is in favour of the 
protection of indigenous knowledge by regulating the access to natural resources to 
ensure the protection of local knowledge and thus indigenous intellectual property. 
However, the Biological Diversity Bill is another illustration of how the government 
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is using the guise of environmental concerns to violate indigenous rights, as it will 
allow transnational corporations to research and use indigenous biodiversity resources 
and knowledge, rejecting indigenous peoples’ rights over their own resources.53 
 
In this debate it is essential to understand that both objectives, preservation of the 
environment and protection of indigenous rights, should be complementary and not 
opposed. At the international level, indigenous peoples are often considered as 
‘environmentally friendly’. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
placed emphasis on the importance of respecting indigenous cultures and several 
environmental NGOs have pointed out that the preservation of the environment is 
interlinked with the protection of indigenous knowledge.54 The declaration adopted at 
the United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development states: ‘[W]e reaffirm 
the vital role of indigenous peoples in sustainable development.’55 Despite such 
declarations, governments often use the protection of the environment as a pretext to 
violate indigenous land rights. As pointed out above in India, indigenous communities 
have often had to pay the price for so-called ‘environmental protection’. The Adivasis 
situation shows how governments might use environmental arguments against 
indigenous rights.  
 
It is also important to stress that the international debate has evolved in recent times 
and international developmental agencies have adopted new guidelines emphasising 
the essential protection of indigenous rights as the basis for developmental or 
environmental projects. In this sense, quite often both the central as well as state 
governments are turning a blind eye to the reports submitted by ad hoc international 
bodies inviting these governments to respect the minimum standards generated by 
international law.56 Locally, the Indian indigenous movement has shown its ability to 
propose alternative policies based on both protection of the environment and respect 
for their fundamental rights. The creation of the Jharkhand Save the Forest Movement 
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is another illustration of this central complementarity between environmental and 
indigenous concerns. 
 
 
 
Adivasis Experience with Self-Rule, Autonomy, and Self-Determination 
 
The Panchayati Raj System: Self-Rule? 
 
After independence, the government engaged itself in a broad ‘Community 
Development Programme’, one of the pillars of which was the development of a 
decentralized system of rural governance under the organizational structure of the 
Panchayati Raj (local government). The Panchayats have two main responsibilities: 
to plan economic development and to organise social justice. The experience started 
at the state level but was finally nationally and constitutionally organised through the 
73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992.57 However, this Act was not applicable 
in states having Scheduled Areas, and the Panchayat system was not extended to tribal 
areas. Following the vast movement of protest organised by the National Front for 
Tribal Self-Rule, the Parliament appointed a committee of experts, the Bhuria 
Committee, to work on the issue. Based on recommendations of this special 
committee, the government finally adopted specific legislation on this issue. In 1996, 
the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) was 
passed to extend the application of the Panchayat system to Scheduled Areas. Under 
the PESA, the Gram Sabha (village council) was given the power to manage natural 
resources, conserve and protect customs and traditions, manage community resources, 
manage minor water bodies, resolve disputes through customary methods, control 
money lending to Scheduled Tribes, and control and manage non-timber forest 
produce (minor forest produce). Thus, the PESA brought a new approach to 
indigenous peoples rights; whereas the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution is based on 
a paternalistic approach giving power to the President and his appointed state 
Governors to rule the rights of the tribals, the Panchayat system is a self-management 
approach based on the decision of the village community represented in the Gram 
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Sabha.  Relating to land control, the Gram Sabha has a central role to prevent 
alienation of land and restore unlawfully alienated land of Scheduled Tribes. On the 
issue of land alienation, the PESA states that ‘…the Gram Sabha or the Panchayats at 
the appropriate level shall be consulted before making the acquisition of land in the 
Scheduled Areas for development projects and before resettling or rehabilitating 
persons affected by such projects in the Scheduled Areas…’58 
 
Even though this new legislation was acclaimed as an ‘historical’ evolution for the 
right of the Adivasis, it was criticised for the fact that the Gram Sabha will only have 
to be consulted by the government before any decision to acquire land. In its 
recommendations to the government, the Bhuria Committee had emphasised the fact 
that ‘land should be acquired with the consent of the Gram Sabha’,59 thus, it was 
hoped that the government would have needed the consent of the village council, 
rather than only having the duty to consult it. The second criticism concerns the 
implementation of the PESA. The PESA states that every concerned state government 
should organize the implementation of the Panchayat system in its respective state. 
States having a recognized, scheduled tribal population were required to make 
appropriate amendments to state laws to give power of self-governance and traditional 
community rights to their tribal population. However, a majority of states have not 
carried out the necessary amendments; several states did not amend their Acts 
according to the PESA, even after the stipulated time.  
 
The PESA also stipulates that, in the implementation process, state governments have 
the power to increase the power given to local councils. However, during the 
implementation process, in some cases, state governments have infringed on the 
power of the local council. For example, the Jharkhand state government passed a 
Panchayat Raj Act in 2001 to implement the central legislation but in violation of 
‘every constitutional principle and in defiance of the central act of 1996’.60 Even 
when states have implemented the Constitutional provision, local administration often 
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tries to subvert the process of self-governance that it is officially pretending to 
facilitate. A striking example of such subversion took place in the state of 
Chhatisgarh, where the district administration of Bastar tried to allot tribal land under 
the Land Acquisition Act to the National Mineral Development Cooperation (NDMC) 
to establish a steel plant in the Scheduled Area of Nagarnar.61  
 
In this case, the concerned Gram Sabhas strongly resisted the proposal of land 
acquisition for the steel plant in the absence of clear plans for the future of the 
villagers. The local administration rejected this position, however, and fabricated 
records concluding with an ‘agreement by majority’ of the Gram Sabha. The 
concerned villagers petitioned the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes,62 which came to the conclusion that the acquisition process violated 
the Constitutional mandate for the Scheduled Areas. The National Commission 
pointed out that neither the letter nor the spirit of the law regarding consultation with 
the Gram Sabhas had been followed. However, the advice of the National 
Commission to restart the process by honouring the spirit of the constitution and legal 
provisions was ignored by the government, and, even though it is a constitutional 
body, the Commission has ‘no teeth’ to ensure the compliance with its decisions. This 
contention remains unresolved and some 365 tribal people have been arrested for 
opposing the district administration on this issue while several others have been the 
victims of police violence.  
 
Thus, the process so far has been disappointing; however, introduction of the PESA is 
still recent and more time is needed to evaluate its full impact in terms of indigenous 
self-governance. Even though officially the PESA provided one year for concerned 
states to enact the constitutional legislation, in most cases the relevant state 
legislations are quite recent. Thus, there is a need to examine the impact of the PESA 
with regard to its implementation by states and its proper impact on village 
governance. It is also relevant to bear in mind that Article 254 of the Constitution of 
India provides that if a state law is not consistent with central law, the state law to the 
extent of repugnancy is void. Therefore, there are still a lot of ways for the Adivasis to 
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push for proper enforcement of the Panchayati Raj system. It is important to 
underline that the PESA has opened up a very important door, as the spirit of this Act 
is based on co-habitation between customary laws and national laws.63 Thus, it might 
take some time before a proper evaluation of the real impact of the PESA can be 
undertaken. 
 
Adivasis Experience with Autonomy 
 
Several Adivasi communities have petitioned for autonomy within Indian democracy 
since independence and sometimes long before. The recent establishment of new 
states in eastern and central India, in fact, came as an answer to autonomy demands 
from the Adivasis.64 Regarding such rights, the different Adivasi communities in the 
Northeast of India have always sought autonomy vis-à-vis the central government. As 
pointed out earlier, some communities have been granted a certain degree of 
autonomy rights under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and tribal affiliation has 
been recognised as a basis for statehood in some parts of the Northeast. But a closer 
scrutiny of those two cases of apparent success towards autonomy rights asserts that 
no significant changes were brought to the concerned tribal communities despite the 
reference to autonomy rights. 
 
Disenchantment in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh 
 
One of the eminent hopes for the development of indigenous peoples’ rights to 
autonomy was the creation of new states in 2000. The formation of Jharkhand and 
Chhattisgarh – newly created states in the eastern regions of India – followed the long 
struggle of the Adivasis of these regions for the creation of their own state.  
 
The Jharkhand movement started about 200 years ago, and the region is famous for its 
anti-colonial rebellions.65 One of the central claims of the movement was the legal 
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recognition of the ancestral system of self-governance of the tribals of the region. To 
different extents across history, the Adivasis of Jharkhand have always lived under 
customary self-governing structures. Those traditional customary systems of 
governance have been put under pressure by different colonisers; however, until 
independence, these systems mainly stayed in place. Jharkhand, meaning ‘forest 
land’, is a dream come true for the tribals of the region as it is the result of a long 
struggle for land rights. The state has created Jharkhand from the existing state of 
Bihar, which is one of the poorest states of India. However, by itself, Jharkhand is a 
region rich in terms of natural resources and industries.  
 
The Adivasi struggle was motivated by the creation of a state in which the Adivasis 
would be a majority, placing them in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the central 
government and allowing them to benefit economically from the wealth of their 
land.66 The 18 districts of the new state cover only half of what the Jharkhand 
Movement leaders asked for. By excluding some indigenous areas from this new 
state, the government managed to form it in such a way that the indigenous peoples 
continue to be a minority within what was supposed to be their own state. The Adivasi 
population is recorded to be as low as 27 percent of the total population of Jharkhand.  
 
Similarly, the Adivasi population of Chhattisgarh fails to constitute the majority of the 
total population of the state. By the exclusion of large tribal areas of the bordering 
states of Orissa and West-Bengal, the government succeeded in maintaining the 
Adivasis as a minority within their newly created, supposedly autonomous states. As a 
result, after only two years of existence, the new state of Jharkhand has already 
witnessed a series of bloody instances of repression against its Adivasis population. 
There were some important demonstrations in this state during the summer 2001, and 
several clashes with the police.In 2002, several Adivasis were killed by police forces 
during a peaceful anti-dam protest. Thus, overall, the establishment of the two new 
states did not bring the hope that it was supposed to carry, and the Adivasis remain a 
minority subject to discrimination of the non-tribal majority. In terms of land 
legislation, the Adivasis did not gain any improvement of their rights, nor can any 
serious evolution of autonomous rights be detected. Thus, after only two years of 
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existence, these two states, which seemed to be a victory for the Adivasis of the 
concerned regions, appear to be more a story of disenchantment. 
 
The Struggle for Autonomy in the Northeast 
 
The Northeast of India is composed of seven states: Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; 
Manipur; Mizoram; Tripura; Nagaland; and Meghalaya. In those seven states the 
indigenous peoples represent a large percentage of the total population and the region 
also contains a high and diverse concentration of different indigenous communities. 
By its geographical position, the Northeastern region regroups several different 
indigenous communities (Mongoloid, Tibeto, Birman racial ancestry) that have lived 
there with little outside contact. The region has historically been separated from 
mainland India; during British colonization the Northeastern regions had always been 
kept under a separate legislation. For example, in 1873, the Inner Line Regulation67 
regulated entrance to the hill district and later the region was considered as an 
‘excluded and partially excluded area’.  
 
Apart from the Nagas, who have always fought for self-determination, most of the 
other communities sought autonomy within India at the time of independence. Thus, 
in 1947, the indigenous communities asked for preservation of specific laws that 
protected their cultures. These demands were acknowledged under the provisional 
constitution of the Sixth Scheduled of the Constitution that provides for a certain 
degree of autonomy. This part of the Constitution operates in parts of the Northeast 
(applicable to the tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram) and 
embodies the notion of self-management of resources and a substantial measure of 
autonomy, including the power to legislate through the Autonomous District Council 
(ADC). As pointed out by one author, this scheme of the constitution highlights two 
major aspects of governmental policy towards the Northeast: ‘(t)he successful 
political incorporation of dissenting minority groups by giving them significant level 
of political autonomy and a major say in determining public policy (…).’68  
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Similar to the facade of autonomous rights, the ADCs set up by the Constitution are 
largely controlled by the centre. The ADCs also depend financially on the central 
government, though state governments have the power to dismiss them. Finally, any 
legislation undertaken by the autonomous council requires the consent of the state 
Governor. These restrictions on autonomy have pushed the indigenous communities 
to ask for real autonomy. Apart from the North-Eastern Areas Reorganization Act of 
1971 that reconstituted the region into a number of distinct states but was ‘only a 
change of name’,69 the reaction of the government has always been to treat this 
demand as a problem of ‘law and order’. In this sense, the region has witnessed 
numerous special laws derogating from general legislation and human rights 
protection.  
 
As early as 1958, the parliament enacted the Armed Forces (Assam-Manipur) Special 
Powers Act, an act extended to the totality of the region by the 1972 Armed Forces 
(Special Powers) Act (AFSPA). Generally, these laws empower army members to 
shoot at any person that is ‘suspected’ of disrupting law and order, protecting military 
personnel from any eventual responsibility for their acts. From time to time, Special 
Ordinances are promulgated to allow the imprisonment of individuals for a period of 
six months to one year without trial. This violence is worsened by the government’s 
inability to respond to the pressure created by the massive arrival of migrants and 
refugees in the region. Some of the crucial issues in the Northeast center around the 
problems generated by the policy of forcible relocation. Migrations from outside India 
or within the national boundaries have drastically affected the position of the 
indigenous peoples of the region, which have found themselves in a minority position 
vis-à-vis new in-groups. There is no prevention and protection of indigenous rights 
from these large-scale settlements of migrant populations within tribal lands, often 
resulting in violent conflict. Despite specific legislation regarding tribal land rights, 
large areas of cultivable lands are transferred to migrants based on the alienation of 
tribal rights, and usually result in the economic exploitation of the Adivasis. This 
scenario aggravates the already difficult social and economic conditions of the 
Adivasis, and also highlights the unwillingness of the government to implement 
effective laws and to address the definitive lack of autonomy of the Adivasi 
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communities of the region. Thus, the situation in the Northeast is not encouraging, 
and after several years of struggle to achieve some degree of autonomy the Adivasis 
continue to face state repression and land-grabbing by the migrants, making the 
Northeast a place where violence is more common than peace. 
 
From Nagaland to Nagalim: Nagas’ Experience with Self-Determination 
 
The Nagas, who live at the junction of China, India and Myanmar (previously 
Burma), have remained unconquered and independent from time immemorial. Even 
though during the British colonization of India some part of the Naga territory was 
administered under British rule, the Nagas retained their independence. When the 
British withdrew from the region, the Nagas saw their land; Nagalim (land of the 
Nagas) divided between India and Burma. The Nagas declared independence one day 
before India. Notwithstanding the promise made at the time of independence by 
Gandhi, despite the Hydari Agreement of 194770 signed between Naga representatives 
and the government that agreed that the Nagas would administer their affairs 
themselves for ten years and then decide on their own future, and regardless of the 
Naga plebiscite of 1951 by which 99.9 percent of the Nagas expressed their desire for 
independence, the Nagas did not get access to their independent national state and the 
promises made by the Indian government have never been honoured.71 To respond to 
the demands of the Nagas and the establishment of the Naga National Council, the 
government resorted to violence and then to negotiation. The government of India 
sent the army and paramilitary forces into the region to suppress the Naga movement. 
This action started the first Indo-Naga conflict during which thousands of people were 
killed and hundreds of villages were burnt down.72 The next attempted solution was 
through political negotiations, which gave birth to the state of Nagaland in 1963. The 
Constitution recognises the specificity of Nagaland, and states that no act of 
parliament in respect of ‘…ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall 
apply to the state of Nagaland unless the legislative assembly of Nagaland by a 
resolution so decides’.73  
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 However, even though a first peace process was agreed (1964-72), the establishment 
of Nagaland did not put an end to the conflict and the Nagas remain divided between 
different states of India. The disagreement persisted as the Nagas insisted on 
sovereignty, whereas the government offered an agreement within the Union of India. 
This resulted in the transfer of Nagaland state from the Ministry of External Affairs to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and the classification of the Naga National Council as an 
unlawful organization. In 1975, the Shillong Accord was signed by a faction of the 
Nagas who later confessed that they signed under duress.74 After several years of 
violence, another ceasefire was signed in 1997 and was extended until August 2003.75 
Even though the government has acknowledged and highlighted the ‘uniqueness’ of 
the Naga case, parallel to the cease-fire, the Indian government and Naga’s 
representatives still disagree on several contentious and central issues. Some of the 
issues concern the peace process itself, as based on past betrayal it might be difficult 
for the Nagas to trust the Indian government on its sincerity and commitment to the 
dialogue.76 During the ceasefire, military forces committed several atrocities against 
the Nagas and draconian laws, such as the AFSPA and the Nagaland Security 
Regulations, are still in place.77 The so-called Operation Good Samaritan has also 
highlighted the ambiguity of the government. In 1995, the launching of Operation 
Good Samaritan gave power to the Army Development Group, i.e. the army, to carry 
out ‘development projects’ across the region. This operation is often designated as a 
‘peace offensive’. As pointed out by the International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs: 
 
Through ‘Operation Good Samaritan’, the army is actually able to freely interfere in people’s 
lives, to disorient them and then co-opt and assimilate them. The Indian authorities fully 
understand the Nagas sense of dignity, self-respect and responsibility is rooted in their 
traditional self-sufficient community-based way of life. The ‘peace offensive’, it appears, is an 
attempt to cripple this.78 
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Indigenous Rights in the Commonwealth Project, supra note 21), available at 
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2001), p. 407. 
78Ibid. 
On substantive issues, the dialogue is just beginning; thus, several central questions 
will have to be resolved including the central issue of the right to self-determination 
of the Nagas. Another significant issue is also likely to be the challenge for the Nagas 
to enter into political discussions to determine their leadership in a decisive manner. 
As highlighted by Vashum, as the talks on substantive issues are being initiated there 
will be a great demand for able statesmanship and leadership from the leaders of the 
government and the Nagas.79 Thus, as stated a few years ago by the Chairman of the 
Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland to the UN Sub-Commission, the question in 
Nagaland remains: ‘…will the international community allow India and Burma to 
continue to exterminate the Naga nation and its right to self-determination?’80  
 
It is important that the international community involve itself in the peace process, 
especially since these peace talks have begun after nearly fifty (50) years of war. It 
remains crucial to monitor the actors and the use of delaying tactics in the tentative 
evolution toward peace.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The overall result of land policy towards Adivasis in India remains poor. The general 
policy protecting land alienation is not working, policies governing the return of 
territory have so far failed, and there is no adequate policy of rehabilitation. Generally 
speaking, land legislation has remained patriarchal. Indian legislation has so far failed 
to provide enough recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditional forms of land tenure 
systems. Even though some communities contained individual households, usually 
village councils owned, controlled, and managed the lands and natural resources 
within those communities. 
 
The Adivasis have been fighting for this recognition through different means but in 
most cases, the response of the government has been inadequate, pushing the Adivasis 
to seek greater autonomy. The government’s reactions have been very poor; when the 
Adivasis sought recognition of their land rights it was denied, when they sought 
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80Oral Statement, Mr. Isak Chishi Swu, United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 1 August 1995 (oral statement delivered by the 
Society for Threatened Peoples). 
autonomy they received minimal land rights protection, and when they sought self-
determination they received limited autonomy rights. There has been some evolution 
as the central government has tried to give more space for the recognition of a tribal 
land tenure system through the recognition of the Gram Sabha.  However, as 
highlighted earlier, this system is in its infancy and state governments are already 
showing their unwillingness to enforce the system. The issue of inequality in land 
policy remains vital all across the country. In this sense, the Sixth Schedule of the 
Constitution should be seen not as a special body of law only applicable in the 
Northeast, but as the minimum threshold of rights guaranteed by the Constitution to 
the Adivasis.  
 
Addressing the future of this issue, Ratnaker Bhengra, who was engaged in the 
Adivasis struggle for autonomy in Jharkhand, stated: ‘We feel that for uniformity in 
the treatment of the Scheduled Tribes/Adivasis in the country, the powers – executive, 
legislative and judicial that is there in the Schedule should apply also in the Fifth 
Schedule.’81  
 
Compared to other countries, India has the potential to clearly recognise collective 
and autonomous tribal rights over their lands. In the debates relating to land rights, the 
issues of collective ownership, traditional land tenure system, and autonomy are 
interlinked. It is now time for the central government and state governments to change 
their ethos and stop treating indigenous demands as an issue of law and order. The 
Adivasi representatives have demonstrated their political ability and should be 
regarded as such and not as terrorists. In this sense, there remains an urgent need for 
the government to withdraw the AFSPA, which has led to human rights abuses. 
However, to conclude on a more positive note, India has to be regarded as a 
promising model for judicial activism among indigenous peoples. As highlighted 
throughout this chapter, the Supreme Court of India has often been successfully 
petitioned in cases related to indigenous peoples rights. An important legal victory 
was gained recently, in fact, when the Supreme Court ordered the closure of the 
Andaman Trunk Road and the removal of settlers from tribal reserves. This road was 
                     
81R. Bhengra, ‘Autonomy in Jharkhand: Past and Present’ (unpublished paper, on file with the author). 
threatening the survival of the Jarawas, a nomadic tribe of the Andaman Islands.82 
This case is just another illustration of the important role that judicial activism can 
play in the fight for indigenous peoples’ rights, and indigenous organisations in India 
have demonstrated their ability to enter such judicial activism. 
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